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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present and analyze a paradox which arises through 
the use of complex events as the denotation of causative verbs within texts. According 
to the majority of event-based theories, complex events consist of at least two parts of 
the same ontological status, namely events. The paradox appears as soon as a single 
complex event can be identified with arbitrarily many parts within the text. A way out 
of the paradoxical situation comes when one recognizes the fact that the verb denotes an 
event, but that its parts are not of the same status. For this analysis I use the discourse-
sensitive strategy of Asher and Lascarides (2003) in order to demonstrate the 
advantages of using discourse entities implied by a verb, which are available for textual 
inference. 
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1. Introduction 
Davidson (1967) first argued persuasively for allowing the use of event variables as  
crucial logical elements in the semantic analysis of verbal predicates. Nowadays, the 
majority of linguistic theories in the innersentential level use the notions of causation 
and event in order to explain the semantics of verbs and the linguistic realization of their 
arguments. All of these theories follow, either explicitly or implicitly, Davidson’s main 
proposal that events enter the semantic analysis of verbs as independent entities and that 
they constitute denotations of verbs. 
The first part of the paper in 1.1 is devoted to the presentation of the paradox that 
arises when one tries to put in use event-based theories for building intersentential 
representations and inferences. I will then use the Segmented Discourse Representation 
Theory’s (henceforth SDRT) perspective on the lexicon-discourse interface and 
particularly on events as lexically denoted variables exploited for textual analysis. 
Although this approach sounds more promising related to the solution of the paradox  
under analysis, I will present some foundational problems it faces. Thereafter, the paper 
unfolds a more improved analysis extending the use of the foundational concept of 
discourse labels of the theory that very naturally solves this important problem of how 
to semantically represent lexical causative verbs. The last part sums up the findings 
under the new framework and the direction for researching the interface between lexical 
and textual meaning. 
 
1.1 The paradox or how to identify events in the text 
Either as variables in a logical language or primitives in a conceptual framework such as 
that of Jackendoff’s (1990), events are organized around more primitive notions, one of 
which is that of causation. However, although the internal complexity of verbal 
denotations seems to enter the discussion about how arguments of verbs are projected 
into syntax or how syntax organizes them in the different projections, depending on the 
position one might adopt regarding the lexicon-syntax debate, most of these theories do 
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not seem to care about how this complexity is cashed out in model-theoretic terms 
particularly when new sentences of the text enter the interpretation procedure. 
Causation is usually seen as a relation between events. Linguistic causation appears 
as a factor for determining the behavior of verbs with their arguments and is clearly 
distinguished from the causation studied by philosophers. The majority of semantic 
theories stipulate that verbs or verbal constructions denote events that consist of 
subevents (for lexical causative verbs) or two compositionally derived events (for more 
complex constructions as resultatives) that are causally connected to each other (a.o. 
Alsina’s 1993, 1999; Chierchia and ConnellGinet 2000; Dowty 1979; Hale and Kayser 
1993; Higginbotham 2000; Jackendoff 1990; Kratzer 1996; Levin and Rapapport 1999, 
2005; Parsons 1990; Pustejovsky 1995; Ramchand 2008). 
For instance, abstracting away from the various theoretical bias of the differing 
analyses, the semantics of the lexical causative verb assume that lexical causative verbs 
of change of state such as break denote a causing subevent and a process subevent that 
includes a result state. Following Levin and Rappaport (1999), the semantic structure of 
these verbs can be represented schematically as in (1). 
 
(1) ‘unspecified event CAUSE BECOME specified state’ 
 
These verbs specify the exact change of state of the object, e.g., the state of broken 
for the vase in (2), but there is no single property that could describe the causing event 
denoted by the lexical verb. In other words, the nature of the causing subevent is 
determined only within a specific context and constrained only by pragmatic means. 
Levin and Rappaport (1999) called the semantic unspecificity of these lexical 
causatives lexical gap, since these verbs “say nothing about the activity of the agent 
which brings about this change”. 
 
(2) John broke the glass 
 
However, note that the unspecificity of the causing subevent does not imply that one 
cannot refer to it by using a pronoun, as shown in (3). The pronoun it in the second 
sentence refers to the breaking of the vase. Therefore, although the cause of the 
breaking is unspecific in the above sense, it can reasonably be thought of as part of the 
semantic structure of the lexical causative verb. 
 
(3) Kelly broke the vase yesterday. It made a very loud noise on the floor 
 
Furthermore, in (4) the throwing-against-the-wall in the second sentence refers back to 
the breaking of the vase in the first sentence. 
 
(4) Kelly broke the vase. She threw it against the wall. 
 
Levin and Rapapport (1999) add that the subevents of lexical causative verbs cannot 
be assigned clearly distinct temporal roles and that the denotation of these subevents 
should be considered independently. 
 
(5) Moshe’s piano playing woke my cat up. 
(cause of the waking up = piano playing)? 
| ---- act/cause of the waking up ---- | | --- result-waking up --- | 
| ------ piano-playing ------------------------------------------------------- |  
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Let us look briefly at one of their interesting examples. Following the usual 
aspectually-based assumptions about the internal temporal structure of the complex 
event denoted by lexical causative verbs, such as that of wake up, I provide a split 
representation of two temporal traces for these verbs. The one on the left indicates the 
cause and the other on the right represents the process along with the relevant result 
state.1 
If Levin and Rapapport (1999), among other theories, follow an aspectually-based 
analysis of the semantic structure of these verbs, there is a central inevitable question 
that these theories need to answer. This question can be addressed in two different 
ways; How do we define the causing subevent of a lexical causative verb in these cases? 
Or else, what kind of temporal constraint would be able to define the relation between 
causing and the resulting part of the denotation? The piano-playing event may occur 
well after the resulting event as the possible interpretation scenario in (5) indicates. Note 
also that the piano-playing event might have also started well before it has some effect 
on the cat. Let us concentrate on the last of these examples in order to see clearly the 
shortcomings of any aspectually-based framework on analyzing verbal meanings and 
their entailments. 
Levin and Rapapport (1999) assume that two seemingly irrelevant events, the event 
of piano-playing and the cause of the waking up of the cat are identified and that this is 
a proof that the two subevents of lexical causative verbs are temporally independent. 
However, under any aspectual theory, time is a major factor for determining the 
semantic structure of lexical causative verbs that lexically entail the result state of the 
affected object.  
Therefore, if we assume that causes precede effects in the world as we know it, it is 
not comprehensible how it is possible that the specific piano playing event causes the 
waking up as we saw in the temporal traces of (5), since the traces in this reading imply 
that the cause may extend well after the effect of the waking up took place. Following 
any of these aspectual representations, one is forced to conclude that it is not the piano 
playing event that causes the waking up but that part of its temporal trace in the above 
representation that corresponds to the relevant part that occurs before the waking up. 
Even though this temporal slice of the piano playing event can still be predicated of by 
the predicate playing the piano, it is critical to realize that in the situation illustrated in 
the schema under (5), it is not the same event with the bigger piano playing described in 
the sentence; or else that there is a different piano playing event. This means that if the 
piano playing event that actually occurred and is illustrated in (5) is e1, the piano 
playing event that corresponds to the cause of the waking up is an event e2. The 
immediate question that emerges, then, is how to identify this new event e2. Is there a 
spatiotemporal region with a specific property that other parts of the bigger piano 
playing event do not have and that caused the waking up? And if there is such property 
how can we trace it? Was there perhaps some part of the piano playing which was 
louder than the others and that was responsible for the waking up? The much deeper 
issue with the indeterminacy of event talk is also related to the talk about the subevents 
denoted by lexical causative verbs, since it is assumed that subevents and events belong 
to the same domain. 
However, even if case one is able to trace a specific property of a smaller piano 
playing event, e2, that caused the waking up, it is still not clear how the spatiotemporal 
properties of the cause of the waking up may be traced in other cases. For if we add 
                                                 
1 I follow the same strategy throughout the whole paper whenever temporal traces are needed. 
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another gerundive in the same sentence that refers to the cause of the waking up as in 
(6), it is not clear how the relevant spatiotemporal part that maps onto the cause of the 
waking up in the corresponding representation below could be described. Perhaps a 
predicate piano playing - singing in our logical language would seem more appropriate 
to describe it, but the location of the event that this new predicates is predicated of 
becomes even more complex. 
 
(6) Moshe’s piano playing and singing woke my cat up. 
      (piano-playing = cause/waking up-act)? 
      | --- cause/waking up-act --- | | --- result-woke up-state --- | 
      | ------ piano-playing ------------------------------------------------------ | 
      | --- singing ------------------ | 
      | - piano-playing/singing --- | 
 
Let us examine some of the questions that any aspectual theory would have to face in 
order to provide a compositional semantics and an account for the entailments of the 
sentence in (6). How could one say which parts of these two events are responsible for 
the causing? How did both of them interact in bringing about the waking up process? 
What is the temporal relation between the two relevant smaller piano playing and 
singing events? Or to put it differently: Did Moshe sing and play the piano at the same 
time and how would the temporal borders be defined in relation to each other and in 
relation to the resulting event?  
 
2. Toward a textual-sensitive solution 
Notice that the two predicates, singing and playing the piano, do not necessarily have to 
be in the same sentence with that of waking up in order to get the interpretation that 
spatiotemporal parts of them caused the waking up. In (7), the second sentence includes 
the two predicates and still allows us to infer that the two events they denote refer back 
to the cause of the waking up. The interpretation of the two-sentence discourse is 
coherent, although there is no natural language conjunction that would indicate the kind 
of semantic connection between the sentences. Therefore, the inference that the two 
events in the second sentence are related to the causing part of the denotation of the 
lexical causative verb in the first one is based exclusively on the lexical semantic 
information and structure of the verbs. 
 
(7) Moshe woke my cat up. He sang and played the piano the whole afternoon. 
 
In other words, the interpretation of the discourse in (7) is that the second sentence 
elaborates on the cause of the waking up expressed by the predicate break. On the other 
hand, if one considers the above difficulty of identifying events and if the cause of the 
waking up should not be viewed as a subevent, an event-like entity, then what kind of 
entity is it?  
The status of the causing part of the denotation is determined by the role it plays in 
the inference process. The causing part of the denotation has a conceptual status and is 
determined only contextually. As we saw, the cause-wakeup cannot be identified by a 
single predicate. Following the examples above, it functions as a label for a 
spatiotemporal region that involves parts of events denoted by other predicates in the 
context. So, the cause-wakeup can only be understood in a contextually defined way. In 
this context and as long as no other event is mentioned that “reveals” some other part of 
the cause-wakeup, the causing part of the denotation is elaborated on by these two 
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events. These two events in this specific context “elaborate” on some aspect of the 
causing subevent; and the context is also defined either inside the sentence (as in (6)) 
expressed here by a gerund) or outside of it via verbal predications. 
The different detail in the granularity of information seems to be also the reason why 
the sentences in (8) can be put side by side in the same text. The second sentence states 
that the vase did not only break, but that it also broke into several pieces. The second 
utterance provides a more detailed description of the change and the speaker is able to 
reveal a different aspect of the same situation with a different predicate. Naturally, then, 
the denotation of predicates like break is simply unspecific to the extent that a different 
predicate or proposition in the context may describe further the state of affairs that it 
describes. 
 
(8) Kelly broke the vase. She smashed it against the wall. 
 
Additionally, assuming that the two-sentence text of (8) is coherent and that, 
therefore, the two utterances should be semantically and pragmatically connected, it is 
necessary to find the relevant discourse or rhetorical relation between them. In the 
absence of any linguistic conjunction or any other linguistic clue, (8) obtains one 
reading; namely that the denotation of the predicate smash in the second sentence 
elaborates on the breaking in the first sentence and consequently that the second 
sentence elaborates on the content of the first. Note, however, that unlike the previous 
examples, the elaboration on the content of the first sentence in (8) is on the kind of 
change that took place and not on the causing part of the denotation. These facts suggest 
that the breaking and the smashing action should be identified in the specific context. 
The identification of the two events in (8) should then be ascribed to context-sensitive 
factors. That means that in this case, one has reasons to identify the smashing and the 
breaking due to discourse coherence and semantic specificity. 
Natural language events resemble other discourse entities in that they are denoted by 
the linguistic forms in which we speak and are essential to discourse coherence. Verbs 
and other event denoting expressions refer to them, but as we just saw, subeventual 
structures make even more complicated the question of how to identify these subevents 
in the context. The semantic structure of the discourse is a prominent factor for 
determining the lexical semantic representation that is relevant for inference and 
interpretation. On the other hand, lexical semantic information is valuable for cases 
similar to those above, namely when there is a lack of explicit cue phrases that indicate 
clearly the kind of connection between two bits of information in the discourse. 
Therefore, any study of the lexical meaning that participates in discourse semantic 
processes should not ignore the structure of the discourse and its semantic and 
pragmatic entailments. 
From this perspective, the denotation of natural language predicates is one of events, 
but the internal complexity is not of subevents. Given the above data, I believe that the 
internal semantic structure of verbs consists of conceptual construals or labels that are 
constructed for the convenience of inference. Under my proposal, the causing part of the 
denotation serves as a tag or label with conceptual status and is assigned to lexical items 
by people in order to help them infer what led to the achievement of the woken up 
resulting state, for the verb wake up for instance, in a specific context. In this way, one 
provides a contextually dependent answer to a much deeper question about what 
criterion is more adequate to event identity. Events with their internal structure can be 
identified only given a specific context. And this context is organized around the 
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rhetorical structure of the discourse. Therefore, the major criterion for identifying these 
events is discourse or textual coherence. 
 
3. Refining SDRT’s lexicon-discourse interface 
 
3.1 A very short crash course on SDRT 
SDRT is a theory that lies in the borders between semantics and pragmatics and its 
ambition is to represent reliably the semantics and pragmatics of discourses and texts. 
Departing from theories of dynamic semantics it differs from them by claiming that the 
connections between the sentences can be encoded in terms of rhetorical relations and 
that underspecification does not only underlie the resolution of scope ambiguities but 
any part of textual inference and interpretation. The most common rhetorical relations 
used within SDRT are: Background, Contrast, Elaboration, Explanation, Narration, 
Commentary, Parallel, Alternation and Correction. Rhetorical relations are basic 
representational devices that incarnate the pragmatic component of SDRT and establish 
the semantic-pragmatic interface.  
 
3.2 Improving existing approaches to the lexicon-discourse interface 
Recently, problems in lexical semantics have been addressed by discourse semantics. A 
new view on lexical causative verbs has arisen based on the idea that lexically entailed 
causation can also influence the connectedness of units bigger than sentences. (Asher 
and Lascarides 1995, 2003) and Danlos (2001a,b) conceive lexical causation as 
potentially available for discourse inference within SDRT. Their account of lexical 
semantics is driven by discourse semantic purposes and should, therefore, be very 
different from the usual lexical semantic approaches. However, they assume analyses 
almost isomorphic to the usual lexical semantic ones, the only difference being that they 
deploy the machinery of the discourse semantic theory SDRT in order to allow lexical 
knowledge to interact with discourse structure. For example, the typical causative verb 
sink, according to Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) theory is analyzed in terms of an entry 
with a rhetorical relation, Result, between utterances that involve two events; the 
causing and the resulting one as in Figure 1. Essentially, the analysis of lexical semantic 
theories for causative verbs is conveyed to SDR Structures that assume a close 
correspondence between events and utterance labels (the πis in the figure below).2 The 
semantics of Result entails the causal relation between the two events expressed in π1 
and π2 and, essentially, this entry does not differ in any important aspect from others’ 
views on the matter. 
                                                 
2 SDR Structures (SDRSs) are the boxes in fig. 1. 
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Figure 1: The discourse-sensitive lexical representation of sink by Asher and Lascarides (2003) 
 
The event variable e is lambda bound as the other two arguments of the verb and is 
available for the semantic composition within the sentence, while the causing subevent 
is not bound within the sentence. Also, π1 of the representation of sink in Figure 1, 
includes the temporal constraint abuts between the two subevents, e and e’. The abuts 
relations is a relation between any two events, one of which initiates just after the other 
reaches its culmination point. In other words, only when the causing subevent 
culminates, the resulting sinking subevent initiates. The causing event, labeled by π, is 
predicated of by a questioned predicate, which represents underspecified information. 
Additionally, the questioned predication is assigned a type (the superscript Act−on) 
from a rich type system provided within the framework of the Generative Lexicon of 
Pustejosvky (1995). This means that it is the context of the utterance that provides event 
descriptions and resolves the underspecification implied by such questioned 
predications. Event descriptions labeled by utterance tokens of the accessible discourse 
may contribute information via some predicate assigned the same type with that of the 
causing event of sink (see (9) below). 
The second sentence in (9) is considered the cause-of-the-sinking and the correct 
interpretation is that the torpedoing had as a Result the sinking process. Such inferences 
are based solely on the lexical semantic knowledge brought in by sink. Following the 
ideas of SDRT about resolving the underspecified predication of sink, the label that tags 
the cause-of-the-sinking is identified with the torpedoing and the lexically triggered 
complex SDRSs is smoothly integrated in the rhetorical structure of the text in a process 
that is reminiscent of anaphora resolution. 
 
(9) The enemy sank the boat. He torpedoed it. 
 
Although SDRT’s existing lexicon-discourse provides us with the right toolkit in order 
to avoid the complexity of the discussion about event identity within textual segments, 
as Tantos (2008) notes, the paradoxes of resolving eventual inference described in 1.1 
are transferred in the labeling schema of SDRT. Therefore, although Asher and 
Lascarides (2003) distinguish πis as labeling segmented information and event terms as 
describing happenings described by predicates, they still base the interface between 
lexicon and discourse on event descriptions and not on the labeling scheme of SDRT. 
Going a bit further, if one admits utterance tokens as the driving force for inference, 
then the relevant problems of resolving underspecified predicates or the complexity 
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associated with building event coreference relations explicated above evaporate. The 
solution I propose is simple in its conception but powerful enough to dissolve the 
enigmas of the simple cases of causative verbs that denote direct causation.3  
The first step is to assume that there is not any kind of anaphora resolution of an 
underspecified predicate in the lexically specified SDRS involved in the inference of 
discourse connections. It has been assumed in SDRT in various places that the level of 
utterance tokens is the right place to seek the relevant connection between two 
segments. Then, following the main argumentation of SDRT and, given the context of 
our discussion about lexically specified πis being part of discourse structure, it is 
logically and empirically unjustified to not base inference in the discourse level on πis. 
Lexical information participates in the process of inferring the rhetorical structure of the 
discourse, but rhetorical underspecification at the discourse level is resolved based on 
the labeling scheme within SDRT and not on the underspecified nature of the labeled 
information. I suggest that the causing denotation of the causative verb is labeled as 
discourse prominent information and is related to other explicitly marked segments of 
the discourse in the usual way. By this, I mean that it is the segmentation task of the 
theory of πis that drives the inference and not the descriptions over events.  
The task of segmenting and rhetorically relating the information in the discourse is 
part of the human conceptual strategy to handle the information in a pragmatically and 
contextually appropriate way. Linguistic event variables differ from labels mainly in 
that they are irreducible terms of the full dynamic SDRSs’ logical forms that receive a 
modeltheoretic interpretation. On the other hand, labels do not refer to the happenings 
of the world but to logical formulas that describe events that are relevant for inferring 
the rhetorical structure. Therefore, there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
events and πis. 
Another point is that although the identification of events in the discourse is a 
difficult and intriguing issue, the identification of utterance tokens in the discourse is 
possible, if the relatedness between segmented information demands it. In this process it 
is not the information that refers to objects and events that is identified, but the need to 
express the judgement of interpreters that information in the discourse is described in 
more than one ways or is connected in more than one ways with more than one 
segments in the discourse. Labels tag information and they are conceptual construals 
that refer to logical forms of the full-fledged SDRS dynamic logic, but not to the 
denotation of these logical forms.4 
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has focused on one main question: namely how events denoted by lexical 
causative verbs are coherently interpreted within discourse. The description of events in 
the discourse is clearly influenced by, and influences, the rhetorical structure of the 
discourse. A serious paradox that arises when one uses any Neo-Davidsoninan event-
based theory off the shelf for textual analysis’ purposes can be resolved as soon as one 
accepts that discourse semantics plays an important role. Starting with the framework of 
SDRT and defining further the character of discourse or textual labels the lexically-
triggered paradox is resolved as a byproduct of resolving rhetorical underspecification. 
 
                                                 
3 Tantos (2008) has shown that simple answers can be given not only for the semantics of lexical 
causative verbs, but also of the complicated case of complex predicates. 
4 Due to space limits it is not possible to demonstrate the technical part of the abstraction of the eventual 
structure. For a detailed analysis of the changes applied in the fundamental principles of the machinery of 
SDRT on the basis of the ideas explicated here, see Tantos (2008). 
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